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ZERO-SUM RISK-SENSITIVE STOCHASTIC GAMES
NICOLE BA¨UERLE∗ AND ULRICH RIEDER‡
Abstract. In this paper we consider two-person zero-sum risk-sensitive stochastic dynamic
games with Borel state and action spaces and bounded reward. The term risk-sensitive refers to
the fact that instead of the usual risk neutral optimization criterion we consider the exponential
certainty equivalent. The discounted reward case on a finite and an infinite time horizon is
considered, as well as the ergodic reward case. Under continuity and compactness conditions
we prove that the value of the game exists and solves the Shapley equation and we show the
existence of optimal (non-stationary) strategies. In the ergodic reward case we work with a local
minorization property and a Lyapunov condition and show that the value of the game solves
the Poisson equation. Moreover, we prove the existence of optimal stationary strategies. A
simple example highlights the influence of the risk-sensitivity parameter. Our results generalize
findings in [1] and answer an open question posed there.
Key words: Risk-sensitive stochastic games, ergodic reward, Shapley equation, Pois-
son equation.
1. Introduction
In this paper we consider two-person zero-sum risk-sensitive stochastic dynamic games with
finite or infinite time horizon. The discounted reward case as well as the ergodic reward case
are considered. The term risk-sensitive refers to the fact that instead of the usual risk neutral
optimization criterion we consider the exponential certainty equivalent which for a random
variable X and a risk sensitivity parameter γ 6= 0 is defined by
ρ(X) =
1
γ
ln
(
E eγX
)
.
For small γ a Taylor series expansion reveals that
ρ(X) = EX +
1
2
γV ar(X) +O(γ2)
and that γ → 0 corresponds to the risk-neutral case. Hence the exponential certainty equivalent
constitutes a risk-adjusted expectation similar to the classical mean-variance criterion. For
deeper economical insight, we refer the reader to [7]. In case γ > 0, the variance is added
and the first player is risk-seeking whereas for γ < 0 the variance is subtracted and the first
player is risk-averse. In the context of a zero-sum game with γ < 0 where the first player wants
to maximize the exponential certainty equivalent and the second player wants to minimize the
exponential certainty equivalent, the second player is often interpreted as the nature which works
against the first player. Thus the game can be seen as a kind of worst-case optimization. Risk-
sensitive optimization problems have been considered since the seminal paper [23], but it was
only lately that this topic gained renewed interest. This is mainly due to applications in finance.
Whereas there are a lot of papers on risk-sensitive Markov Decision processes under different
optimization criteria (see e.g. [23, 32, 24, 21, 14, 8, 10, 15, 25, 11, 4, 31, 5, 6]), there are only a
few papers on risk-sensitive stochastic games in discrete time. In [27] the author considers Nash
equilibria for a two-person non-zero-sum game with a quadratic-exponential cost criterion and in
[26] the authors treat so-called overlapping generations models. In [1] the authors consider two-
person zero-sum risk-sensitive stochastic games with countable state space under the discounted
cost criterion and the ergodic cost criterion. In their model the authors replace the one-stage cost
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in the exponential by the average over the randomized policies and later make the simplifying
assumption that the one-stage cost does not depend on the actions of the two players. The
average cost problem is solved with a standard uniform ergodicity condition. There are more
papers on risk-sensitive stochastic differential games, i.e. games in continuous time (see e.g.
[16, 18, 2, 13]). But the solution techniques via Backward Stochastic Differential Equations and
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs equations are quite different.
In this paper we extend the results of [1]. Throughout we work with Borel state and action
spaces and general one-stage rewards which may depend on actions of both players. The one-
stage rewards are assumed to be bounded. Since we use randomized actions, we interpret
expectations w.r.t. the evolution of the state process and the randomization over actions. First
we consider the finite horizon stochastic game, then the infinite horizon discounted game. We
show that the value of the game exists and satisfies the Shapley equation. Moreover, we prove
the existence of optimal strategies for both players which has been posed as an open problem in
[1]. In order to be able to apply the usual minimax theorem for the existence of saddle points, we
need convexity of the expression in the Shapley equation w.r.t. to the randomization measures
for the actions of player 1 and 2. This is achieved by applying a trick which has been used in
[24] before: We consider a modified transition measure which is not necessarily a probability
measure any more and contains part of the reward. The same approach also works for the
infinite horizon with discount factor β < 1. We again obtain the Shapley equation for the value
of the game and show the existence of optimal strategies - a statement which has been posed as
an open question in [1] (Remark 1). We treat both the risk-seeking (γ > 0) and the risk-averse
case (γ < 0). In the ergodic reward case we assume β = 1 and use a local minorization property
together with a Lyapunov condition in order to obtain ergodicity (see [19, 31]). For γ = 0, i.e. in
the risk-neutral situation, our condition reduces to the one in [19] for the ergodicity of Markov
chains. Here we show for small γ that the value of the game does not depend on the initial
state and is a partial solution of the Poisson equation. Moreover, there exist optimal stationary
strategies for both players.
Our paper is organized as follows: In the next section we introduce our model and formulate
the problem for a finite time horizon. Moreover, we introduce some continuity and compactness
conditions which we use throughout our paper for the existence of optimal strategies. In section
3 we first consider the problem with a finite time horizon and prove the Shapley equation for the
value of the game and the existence of optimal (non-stationary) strategies. In this section we
also present a simple example which highlights the influence of the risk sensitivity parameter γ
on the optimal strategies for the players. In Section 4 we consider the infinite horizon discounted
reward game. Under the same condition as in Section 3 we show a Shapley equation for the
optimal value of the game and prove the existence of optimal stationary strategies. Finally in
Section 5 we solve the ergodic risk-sensitive game under local ergodicity conditions.
2. Model Formulation
We suppose that the following two-person zero-sum stochastic game is given: The state space
is a Borel set E, the action spaces for player 1 and 2 are denoted by A and B respectively and
are Borel spaces too. It is assumed that E×A contains the graph of a measurable map from E
into A and that E× B contains the graph of a measurable map from E into B. For any x ∈ E,
the non-empty and measurable x-section Ax of A denotes the set of all admissible actions for
player 1, if the system is in state x. The analogous assumptions and notations are used for
player 2. We suppose that there is a transition kernel Q from E×A×B to E and a measurable
reward function r : E× A× B→ R for player 1 which is bounded and without loss of generality
0 ≤ r ≤ r¯.
The game is played as follows: At each stage both players observe the current state x ∈ E
and choose actions a ∈ Ax and b ∈ Bx independently of each other. Player 1 then receives the
reward r(x, a, b). Afterwards the system moves to a new state according to the transition kernel
Q(·|x, a, b). The reward may be discounted by a factor β ∈ (0, 1]. The aim of the first player
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is to maximize the risk-sensitive accumulated reward of the stochastic game over a finite or an
infinite time horizon and the aim of the second player is to minimize it. Before we introduce the
objectives, let us first define the policies. Since even for ordinary risk-neutral games it is known
that optimal policies can only be found in the class of randomized policies, we have to consider
this class too. Let us denote by P(A) the set of all probability measures on A, endowed with the
weak topology. Then
{(x, µ, ν) : x ∈ E, µ ∈ P(Ax), ν ∈ P(Bx)}
is a measurable subset of E × P(A) × P(B). We will denote by F the set of all measurable
mappings f : E→ P(A) such that f(x) ∈ P(Ax) for all x ∈ E. The decision rule f is interpreted
as a randomized decision rule for player 1. A randomized Markovian policy is then a sequence
of decision rules (fn) with fn ∈ F. Similarly for player 2, we denote the set of all randomized
decision rules by G and elements by g ∈ G. In this paper we do not consider non-Markovian
policies, since as for the risk-neutral game, it can be shown that the value functions remain
unchanged if the set of admissible policies is enlarged to the class of history-dependent policies.
This has first been shown for risk-neutral Markov Decision Processes in Theorem 18.4 of [22]. For
general certainty equivalents the question has been considered in [4]. Though in general optimal
policies are history dependent, the statement holds for the exponential certainty equivalent. The
proof given in [4] directly generalizes to the game setting. A randomized stationary policy is a
Markovian policy (fn) where fn = f independent of n.
Two randomized policies pi = (fn) and σ = (gn) together with the initial state x define
according to the Theorem of Ionescu Tulcea a probability measure Ppiσx on (E× A× B)∞ by
Ppiσx (A0 ×B0 × C1 × . . . An−1 ×Bn−1 × Cn × E× A× B× . . .) =
=
∫
A0
∫
B0
∫
C1
. . .
∫
Cn
Q(dxn|xn−1, an−1, bn−1)fn−1(xn−1)(dan−1)gn−1(xn−1)(dbn−1) . . .
. . . Q(dx1|x0, a0, b0)f0(x0)(da0)g0(x0)(db0).
The reward generated by the policies over N stages is
RN :=
N−1∑
k=0
βkr(Xk, Ak, Bk).
The risk-sensitive reward (exponential certainty equivalent) for player 1 under the policies pi and
σ is then given by
1
γ
lnEpiσx
[
exp
(
γRN
)]
(2.1)
where Epiσx is the expectation under Ppiσx and (A0, B0, X1, . . .) is the process under pi and σ. We
first assume that the risk-sensitivity parameter γ ∈ (0, γ¯]. Since γ is positive and the logarithm
is monotone we can equivalently consider the optimization criterion
VNpiσ(x, γ) := Epiσx
[
exp
(
γRN
)]
. (2.2)
The term zero-sum game refers to the fact that the total utility of player 1 is exp
(
γRN
)
and
we assume that the total utility of player 2 is − exp (γRN). The corresponding upper value of
the game over N stages is given by
VN (x, γ) := inf
σ
sup
pi
VNpiσ(x, γ). (2.3)
If infσ suppi VNpiσ(x, γ) = suppi infσ VNpiσ(x, γ), the function VN is called value function of the
stochastic game. A policy pi∗ is called optimal for player 1 for the N -stage game if
VNpi∗σ(x, γ) ≥ sup
pi
inf
σ′
VNpiσ′(x, γ), for all σ.
A policy σ∗ is called optimal for player 2 for the N -stage game if
VNpiσ∗(x, γ) ≤ inf
σ
sup
pi′
VNpi′σ(x, γ), for all pi.
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A pair of policies (pi∗, σ∗) for which
VNpiσ∗ ≤ VNpi∗σ∗ ≤ VNpi∗σ, for all pi, σ
is called saddle-point equilibrium and implies that pi∗ is optimal for player 1, σ∗ is optimal for
player 2 and that VNpi∗σ∗ = VN . In order to ease notation we will in general call (pi
∗, σ∗) a
saddle-point of a function v(pi, σ) if
v(pi, σ∗) ≤ v(pi∗, σ∗) ≤ v(pi∗, σ), for all pi, σ.
Throughout we make the following assumptions (see e.g. [3]):
(A1) The sets Ax and Bx are compact for every x ∈ E.
(A2) The correspondences x 7→ Ax and x 7→ Bx are continuous. We call a correspondence x 7→
Ax continuous if it is upper-semicontinuous, meaning that {x ∈ E : Ax∩C 6= ∅} is closed
in E for every closed subset C ⊂ A, and lower-semicontinuous if {x ∈ E : Ax ∩D 6= ∅} is
open in E for every open subset D ⊂ A.
(A3) The mapping (x, a, b) 7→ r(x, a, b) is continuous.
(A4) The transition measure Q is weakly continuous, i.e. for all bounded and continuous
v : E→ R we have that (x, a, b) 7→ ∫ v(x′)Q(dx′|x, a, b) is continuous.
Note that the assumptions are of course satisfied when E is countable and Ax and Bx are
finite.
3. Finite Horizon Discounted Game
We solve the problem by transforming it to the classical risk-neutral setup with a different
transition measure. Such a transformation has also been used in the context of risk-sensitive
partially observable models (see [24]). Recall that we first restrict to the case γ > 0. Let us
define a transition measure Q˜ from E× (0, γ¯]× A× B to E by
Q˜(dx′|x, γ, a, b) := eγr(x,a,b)Q(dx′|x, a, b), (x, γ, a, b) ∈ E× (0, γ¯]× A× B. (3.1)
It follows directly from this definition that Q˜ is also weakly continuous in (x, γ, a, b). Moreover,
define for µ ∈ P(Ax) and for ν ∈ P(Bx)
Q˜(dx′|x, γ, µ, ν) :=
∫ ∫
Q˜(dx′|x, γ, a, b)µ(da)ν(db), (x, γ) ∈ E× (0, γ¯]. (3.2)
For f ∈ F, g ∈ G, µ ∈ P(Ax), ν ∈ P(Bx) and a bounded, measurable function v : E×(0, γ¯]→ R
let us introduce the following operators:
(Tfgv)(x, γ) :=
∫
v(x′, βγ)Q˜(dx′|x, γ, f(x), g(x)),
(Lv)(x, γ, µ, ν) :=
∫
v(x′, βγ)Q˜(dx′|x, γ, µ, ν),
(Tv)(x, γ) := inf
g
sup
f
(Tfgv)(x, γ)
= inf
ν
sup
µ
(Lv)(x, γ, µ, ν).
In what follows we always set V0(x, γ) = 1. The value of the game for fixed policies can be
computed with the help of the Tfg-operator.
Theorem 3.1. Let pi = (f0, f1, . . .) and σ = (g0, g1, . . .) be randomized policies for player 1 and
2 respectively. Then it holds for all n = 1, . . . , N that
a) Vnpiσ(x, γ) =
∫
Vn−1−→pi ,−→σ (x′, βγ)Q˜
(
dx′|x, f0(x), g0(x), γ
)
= (Tf0g0Vn−1−→pi ,−→σ )(x, γ), where−→pi = (f1, f2, . . .) and −→σ = (g1, g2, . . .) are the shifted policies.
b) Vnpiσ = Tf0g0Tf1g1 . . . Tfn−1gn−1V0.
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Proof. It suffices to prove part a), since part b) follows directly from a) and the definition of the
operators. Part a) is done by induction. For n = 1 we obtain
V1piσ(x, γ) = Epiσx
[
exp
(
γr(X0, A0, B0)
)]
=
∫ ∫
exp
(
γr(x, a, b)
)
f0(x)(da)g0(x)(db)
=
∫
V0 Q˜
(
dx′|x, γ, f0(x), g0(x)
)
.
Now suppose the statement is true for n− 1. We obtain
Vnpiσ(x, γ) = Epiσx
[
exp
(
γ
n−1∑
k=0
βkr(Xk, Ak, Bk)
)]
=
∫ ∫ ∫
exp
(
γr(x, a, b)
) ·
·E−→pi−→σx1
[
exp
(
γ
n−1∑
k=1
βkr(Xk, Ak, Bk)
)]
Q(dx1|x, a, b)f0(x)(da)g0(x)(db)
=
∫
E
−→pi−→σ
x1
[
exp
(
βγ
n−2∑
k=0
βkr(Xk, Ak, Bk)
)]
Q˜(dx1|x, γ, f0(x), g0(x))
and the induction hypothesis implies the statement. 
The next theorem provides the solution of the problem. Let us denote by C the set of
continuous and bounded functions on E× (0, γ¯].
Theorem 3.2. Assume (A1)-(A4).
a) For all n = 1, . . . , N it holds that Vn ∈ C and
Vn(x, γ) = (TVn−1)(x, γ) = sup
µ
inf
ν
∫
Vn−1(x′, βγ)Q˜(dx′|x, γ, µ, ν).
b) For n = 1, . . . , N there exist measurable functions (µ∗n, ν∗n) : E × (0, γ¯] → P(A) ×
P(B) which are admissible, i.e. µ∗n(x, γ) ∈ P(Ax) and ν∗n(x, γ) ∈ P(Bx) such that
(µ∗n(x, γ), ν∗(x, γ)) is a saddle point of
(µ, ν) 7→ LVn−1
(
x, γ, µ, ν
)
for all (µ, ν) ∈ P(Ax)×P(Bx). Then VN is the value of the N -stage stochastic game and
(pi∗, σ∗) = (f∗n, g∗n)n=0,...,N−1 with f∗n(x) := µ∗N−n(x, γβ
n) and g∗n(x) := ν∗N−n(x, γβ
n) are
optimal policies for player 1 and 2 respectively.
Proof. First we define for all admissible (µ, ν) : E × (0, γ¯] → P(A) × P(B) and functions v ∈ C
the operator
(Tµνv)(x, γ) := (Lv)
(
x, γ, µ(x, γ), ν(x, γ)
)
.
Also note that for v ∈ C it holds that there exists a (measurable) saddle point (µ∗, ν∗) such that
Lv
(
x, γ, µ(x, γ), ν∗n(x, γ)
) ≤ Lv(x, γ, µ∗n(x, γ), ν∗n(x, γ)) ≤ Lv(x, γ, µ∗(x, γ), ν(x, γ))
or equivalently
(Tµν∗v)(x, γ) ≤ (Tµ∗ν∗v)(x, γ) ≤ (Tµ∗νv)(x, γ)
for all (µ, ν) and that (x, γ) 7→ Lv(x, γ, µ∗(x, γ), ν∗(x, γ)) ∈ C. This follows from a classical
measurable selection theorem in [9] and a minimax theorem (Theorem 2) in [17], see e.g. [29].
By induction on n we show that
(i) Vn = TVn−1 ∈ C,
(ii) Tµnν∗n . . . Tµ1ν∗1V0 ≤ Vn for any measurable µ1, . . . , µn : E× (0, γ¯]→ P(A),
(iii) Tµ∗nν∗n . . . Tµ∗1ν∗1V0 = Vn,
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(iv) Tµ∗nνn . . . Tµ∗1ν1V0 ≥ Vn for any measurable ν1, . . . , νn : E× (0, γ¯]→ P(B),
and finally that Tµ∗Nν
∗
N
. . . Tµ∗1ν∗1V0 = Tf∗0 g∗0 . . . Tf∗N−1g
∗
N−1V0 = VNpi∗σ∗ .
For n = 1 we obtain by definition of V1 and Theorem 3.1 that
V1 = inf
g
sup
f
TfgV0 = TV0.
The remaining statements (ii)-(iv) follow directly from the definition of µ∗1, ν∗1 and V1. Now
suppose the statement is true for n − 1. Obviously the Tµν-operator is monotone, i.e. for
v, w ∈ C with v ≤ w we obtain Tµνv ≤ Tµνw. Since Vn−1 ∈ C, the selection theorem and the
minimax theorem imply the existence of a saddle point (µ∗n, ν∗n) on stage n. With the induction
hypothesis we obtain
Tµnν∗n . . . Tµ1ν∗1V0 ≤ Tµnν∗nVn−1 ≤ Tµ∗nν∗nVn−1 = Tµ∗nν∗n . . . Tµ∗1ν∗1V0
for any µ1, . . . , µn. On the other hand
Tµ∗nν∗nVn−1 ≤ Tµ∗nνnVn−1 ≤ Tµ∗nνn . . . Tµ∗1ν1V0.
for any ν1, . . . , νn. Moreover since we can identify a sequence (µ1, . . . , µn) with a policy pi =
(f0, . . . , fn−1) by setting fk(x) := µn−k(x, γβk) for k = 0, . . . , n−1 and similarly for pi∗, σ, σ∗, we
have shown that there exist policies pi∗ and σ∗ for the n-stage game such that for any arbitrary
policies pi, σ
Vnpiσ∗ ≤ Vnpi∗σ∗ ≤ Vnpi∗σ.
But this means that (pi∗, σ∗) is a saddle-point and Vn = Vnpi∗σ∗ = Tµ∗nν∗n . . . Tµ∗1ν∗1V0 is the value
of the game and pi∗ and σ∗ are optimal for player 1 and 2 respectively.
Combining above results, the statement follows. 
Remark 3.3. If β = 1 we can skip the second component and simply write the Shapley equation
as Vn(x) = (TVn−1)(x) = supµ infν
∫
Vn−1(x′)Q˜(dx′|x, µ, ν).
Remark 3.4. With the algorithm in Theorem 3.2 we finally compute the value VN (x, γ) in
(2.3). However, the main interest is the certainty equivalent in (2.1). Of course by setting
V˜N (x, γ) :=
1
γ lnVN (x, γ) we obtain this value and we can easily modify the Shapley equation
to obtain an equation for the certainty equivalent. Indeed it holds that
V˜n(x, γ) = sup
µ
inf
ν
1
γ
ln
∫
eγV˜n−1(x
′,βγ)Q˜(dx′|x, γ, µ, ν).
Remark 3.5. We have stated our results in the framework of γ > 0, but the same arguments
and statements also hold true in case γ < 0. One only has to consider the state space E× [γ, 0).
Example 3.6. In order to study the effect of the risk aversion parameter γ, we consider a simple
one-period game where players have only two actions, i.e. A = B = {−1,+1}. In this situation
we do not need a state and can skip x. The risk-sensitive reward for player 1 under policies
pi = (f0) := (1− y, y) and σ = (g0) := (1− z, z) is then given by
V1piσ(γ) := Epiσ
[
exp
(
γr(A0, B0)
)]
= eγr(−1,−1)(1− y)(1− z) + eγr(−1,1)(1− y)z + eγr(1,−1)y(1− z) + eγr(1,1)yz.
We assume that min{r(−1,−1), r(1, 1)} > max{r(−1, 1), r(1,−1)}. The general solutions for
the optimal strategies for player 1 and 2 are:
y∗ =
eγr(−1,1) − eγr(−1,−1)
eγr(−1,1) + eγr(1,−1) − eγr(−1,−1) − eγr(1,1) ,
z∗ =
eγr(1,−1) − eγr(−1,−1)
eγr(−1,1) + eγr(1,−1) − eγr(−1,−1) − eγr(1,1) .
These solutions depend on γ 6= 0. In our numerical example we have chosen
r(−1,−1) = 5, r(−1, 1) = 3, r(1,−1) = 2, r(1, 1) = 4.
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Figure 1. Optimal strategies for both players as a function of γ 6= 0 (left) and
value of the game as a function of γ 6= 0 (right).
Figure 1 shows the optimal (randomized) strategies as functions of γ. The case γ = 0 corresponds
to the risk-neutral game with optimal strategies y∗ = 0.5 and z∗ = 0.75. As we can see from
Figure 1, but can also be shown analytically, is that y(γ) → 1, z(γ) → 1 for γ → ∞, i.e. in
this case the players asymptotically use pure strategies and agree on the best value for player
1. For γ → −∞ we obtain y(γ) → 0, z(γ) → 1, i.e. again both players use asymptotically
pure strategies and this time agree on the worst value for player 1. Intuitively this behavior is
clear, since the randomization of the strategies is the only stochastic component in this model
and whereas it is optimal to use randomized strategies in the risk-neutral case (γ = 0) players
tend to reduce their own produced variability if |γ| → ∞. For the special model with countable
state space in [1], the authors have shown in Section 5 that this observation is also true for
the risk-sensitive average reward case. The behavior of the optimal strategies in the discounted
reward case is still open.
4. Infinite Horizon Discounted Game
In this section we consider the game with an infinite time horizon and β ∈ (0, 1). The
risk-sensitive reward for player 1 under the policies pi and σ is here given by
V∞piσ(x, γ) := Epiσx
[
exp
(
γ
∞∑
k=0
βkr(Xk, Ak, Bk)
)]
. (4.1)
The corresponding upper value of the game is
V∞(x, γ) := inf
σ
sup
pi
V∞piσ(x, γ). (4.2)
If infσ suppi V∞piσ(x, γ) = suppi infσ V∞piσ(x, γ), the function V∞ is called value function of the
stochastic game with infinite time horizon. A policy pi∗ is called optimal for player 1 in this case
if
V∞pi∗σ(x, γ) ≥ sup
pi
inf
σ
V∞piσ(x, γ), for all σ.
A policy σ∗ is called optimal for player 2 if
V∞piσ∗(x, γ) ≤ inf
σ
sup
pi
V∞piσ(x, γ), for all pi.
8 N. BA¨UERLE AND U. RIEDER
The policy pair (pi∗, σ∗) for which
V∞piσ∗ ≤ V∞pi∗σ∗ ≤ V∞pi∗σ, for all pi, σ
is called saddle-point equilibrium and implies that pi∗ is optimal for player 1 and σ∗ is optimal
for player 2.
4.1. Positive risk-sensitivity γ > 0. Here we assume that γ ∈ (0, γ¯] and denote the upper
bound of r by r¯. The next theorem provides the solution of the infinite horizon problem. Recall
that C is the set of all continuous and bounded functions on E× (0, γ¯].
Theorem 4.1. Assume (A1)-(A4) and let γ ∈ (0, γ¯].
a) It holds that V∞ is the unique solution v ∈ C of the Shapley equation
V∞(x, γ) = TV∞(x, γ) = inf
ν
sup
µ
∫
V∞(x′, βγ)Q˜(dx′|x, γ, µ, ν)
with 1 ≤ v(x, γ) ≤ eγ r¯1−β .
b) There exist measurable functions (µ∗, ν∗) : E×(0, γ¯]→ P(A)×P(B) with µ∗(x, γ) ∈ P(Ax)
and ν∗(x, γ) ∈ P(Bx) such that (µ∗(x, γ), ν∗(x, γ)) is a saddle point of
(µ, ν) 7→ LV∞
(
x, γ, µ, ν
)
for all (µ, ν) ∈ P(Ax) × P(Bx). Then V∞ is the value of the infinite horizon stochastic
game and (pi∗, σ∗) = (f∗n, g∗n)n=0,...,N−1 with f∗n(x) := µ∗(x, γβn) and g∗n(x) := ν∗(x, γβn)
are optimal policies for player 1 and 2 respectively.
Proof. a) Obviously the values Vn = T
nV0 of the n-stage games are increasing and bounded
and hence a limit V := limn→∞ Vn exists. We first prove that V∞ = V . By monotonicity
we see directly that Vn ≤ V∞ which implies that V ≤ V∞. On the other hand we have
for arbitrary policies pi and σ that V∞piσ(x, γ) ≤ Vnpiσ(x, γ) · δn with δn := exp
(
γβn r¯1−β
)
and limn→∞ δn = 1. Thus we obtain
V∞(x, γ) = inf
σ
sup
pi
V∞piσ(x, γ) ≤ inf
σ
sup
pi
Vnpiσ(x, γ) · δn = Vn(x, γ) · δn
which yields V∞ ≤ V and thus equality. Note that the convergence limn→∞ Vn = V∞ is
uniform because of
0 ≤ V∞(x, γ)− Vn(x, γ) ≤ Vn(x, γ) · (δn − 1) ≤ eγ¯
r¯
1−β ·
(
exp
(
γ¯βn
r¯
1− β
)
− 1
)
.
The right hand side converges to 0 for n → ∞ and does not depend on x and γ any
more. Uniform convergence implies that V∞ ∈ C again.
Next we show that V∞ = TV∞. Since Vn ≤ V∞ we obtain by applying the T -operator
to this inequality that Vn+1 = TVn ≤ TV∞ and by letting n→∞ that V∞ = V ≤ TV∞.
On the other hand we have V∞ ≤ Vn · δn and again by applying the T -operator to this
inequality we obtain TV∞ ≤ T (Vn · δn) = δn · TVn = δn · Vn+1. Thus by letting n → ∞
we obtain TV∞ ≤ V∞ and hence V∞ = TV∞.
Finally we show the uniqueness of the solution of the Shapley equation in the set of
continuous functions with lower bound b := 1 and upper bound b¯(γ) := e
γ r¯
1−β . The first
step is to see that Tb ≥ b because Q˜ is not necessarily a probability measure but has a
total mass larger or equal to 1. On the other hand we have
T b¯(x, γ) = inf
ν
sup
µ
∫ ∫
b¯(βγ)eγr(x,a,b)µ(da)ν(db) ≤ eγr¯eγβ r¯1−β = b¯(γ).
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Since the T -operator is monotone we have that Tnb ↑ and Tnb¯ ↓ for n→∞. Obviously
we obtain
Tnb(x, γ) = Vn(x, γ) = inf
σ
sup
pi
Epiσx
[
exp
(
γ
n−1∑
k=0
βkr(Xk, Ak, Bk)
)]
Tnb¯(x, γ) = δnVn(x, γ) = δnT
nb(x, γ).
Hence we see that Tnb ↑ V∞ and Tnb¯ ↓ V∞ for n → ∞. Now suppose that there is
another solution v ∈ C of v = Tv with b ≤ v ≤ b¯. This then implies that Tnb ≤ v ≤ Tnb¯
for all n which shows uniqueness of the fixed point.
b) The existence of a saddle point (µ∗, ν∗) follows again from the measurable selection
theorem and the minimax theorem. Let Tµνv be defined as in Theorem 3.2. By mono-
tonicity and the fact that 1 ≤ V∞(x, γ) ≤ eγ
r¯
1−β we obtain that limn→∞ Tnµ∗ν∗V0 =
limn→∞ Tnµ∗ν∗V∞ = V∞pi∗σ∗ for pi∗, σ∗ defined in the statement. By the definition of the
saddle point we obtain for any admissible (µ1, ν1) : E× (0, γ¯]→ P(A)× P(B) that
Tµ1ν∗V∞ ≤ Tµ∗ν∗V∞ ≤ Tµ∗ν1V∞.
As usual the saddle point property implies that supµ infν TµνV∞ = infν supµ TµνV∞ =
TV∞ = V∞ and Tµ∗ν∗V∞ = V∞. Hence we can also write
Tµ1ν∗V∞ ≤ V∞ ≤ Tµ∗ν1V∞.
By iterating this inequality n-times we end up with
Tµ1ν∗ . . . Tµnν∗V∞ ≤ V∞ ≤ Tµ∗ν1 . . . Tµ∗νnV∞
for arbitrary µ1, . . . µn and ν1, . . . , νn. Letting n→∞ implies since 1 ≤ V∞(x, γ) ≤ eγ
r¯
1−β
that limn→∞ Tµ∗ν1 . . . Tµ∗νnV∞ = limn→∞ Tµ∗ν1 . . . Tµ∗νnV0 = V∞pi∗σ for σ = (g1, g2, . . .)
with gn(x) = νn(x, γβ
n). The same is true on the left-hand side. In total we obtain that
V∞piσ∗ ≤ V∞pi∗σ∗ = V∞ ≤ V∞pi∗σ
for all policies pi and σ which yields the statement.

4.2. Negative risk-sensitivity γ < 0. Here we assume that γ ∈ [γ¯, 0). The next theorem
provides the solution of the infinite horizon problem.
Theorem 4.2. Let γ ∈ [γ¯, 0). Theorem 4.1 holds as before with bounds eγ r¯1−β ≤ v(x, γ) ≤ 1 in
part a).
Proof. Note that most inequalities simply reverse. In particular we obtain V∞(x, γ) ≥ Vn(x, γ)·δn
with δn as in the previous proof.

5. Ergodic Game
In this section we consider the risk-sensitive average reward with β = 1. Following Remark
3.3 we now skip the dependence on γ in our notations. Hence for two randomized policies pi and
σ for player 1 and 2 respectively we define
Jpiσ(x) := lim sup
n→∞
1
n
1
γ
lnEpiσx
[
exp(γ
n−1∑
k=0
r(Xk, Ak, Bk))
]
(5.1)
J(x) := inf
σ
sup
pi
Jpiσ(x). (5.2)
In case we have stationary policies, i.e. pi = (f, f, . . .) and σ = (g, g, . . .) we simply write Jfg(x).
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If infσ suppi Jpiσ(x) = suppi infσ Jpiσ(x), the function J is called value function of the average
reward stochastic game. A policy pi∗ is called optimal for player 1 in this case if
Jpi∗σ(x) ≥ sup
pi
inf
σ
Jpiσ(x), for all σ.
A policy σ∗ is called optimal for player 2 if
Jpiσ∗(x) ≤ inf
σ
sup
pi
Jpiσ(x), for all pi.
The policy pair (pi∗, σ∗) for which
Jpiσ∗ ≤ Jpi∗σ∗ ≤ Jpi∗σ, for all pi, σ
is called saddle-point equilibrium and implies that pi∗ is average optimal for player 1 and σ∗ is
average optimal for player 2.
Here we cannot ignore the logarithm (see Remark (3.4)) and define for f ∈ F, g ∈ G, µ ∈
P(Ax), ν ∈ P(Bx) and a measurable function v : E → R the following operators, given the
expectation exists:
(Ufgv)(x) :=
1
γ
ln
∫
eγv(x
′)Q˜(dx′|x, f(x), g(x)),
(Uv)(x) := inf
g
sup
f
(Ufgv)(x)
Recall the definition of Q˜ in (3.2). Since γ is fixed here we suppress the dependence on γ.
Obviously Q˜ is in general not a probability measure. The normalizing constant is for x ∈ E, µ ∈
P(Ax) and ν ∈ P(Bx) given by
c(x, µ, ν) :=
∫
E
Q˜(dx′|x, µ, ν) =
∫ ∫
eγr(x,a,b)µ(da)ν(db).
Since 0 ≤ r ≤ r¯, the function c is also bounded. More precisely 1 ≤ c(x, µ, ν) ≤ eγr¯ for all x, µ, ν
in case γ > 0 and eγr¯ ≤ c(x, µ, ν) ≤ 1 in case γ < 0. Thus
Qˆ(·|x, µ, ν) := Q˜(·|x, µ, ν)
c(x, µ, ν)
defines a transition kernel and using the notation rˆ(x, µ, ν) := 1γ ln c(x, µ, ν) we can rewrite the
U -operator as
(Uv)(x) = inf
ν
sup
µ
{
rˆ(x, µ, ν) +
1
γ
ln
∫
eγv(x
′)Qˆ(dx′|x, µ, ν)
}
. (5.3)
Note that 0 ≤ rˆ ≤ r¯. Due to the dual representation of the exponential certainty equivalent (see
e.g. Lemma 3.3 in [20]) it is possible to write
(Uv)(x) = inf
ν
sup
µ
sup
ψ
{
rˆ(x, µ, ν) +
∫
v(x′)ψ(dx′)− 1
γ
I
(
ψ, Qˆ(·|x, µ, ν))}. (5.4)
where the supremum is over all probability measures ψ ∈ P(E) and I(p, q) is the relative entropy
of the two probability measures p, q which is defined by
I(p, q) :=
∫
ln
dp
dq
p(dx)
when p q and +∞ otherwise.
Note that the maximal probability measure in (5.4) is given by
ψv(B|x, µ, ν) :=
∫
B e
γv(x′)Qˆ(dx′|x, µ, ν)∫
E e
γv(x′)Qˆ(dx′|x, µ, ν) (5.5)
for measurable sets B ⊂ E, provided the denominator is finite. Obviously ψv can be interpreted
as a transition kernel.
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In what follows let w : E→ [1,∞) be a measurable weight function and define for measurable
functions v : E→ R the weighted supremum norm by
‖v‖w := sup
x∈E
|v(x)|
w(x)
.
By Bw we denote the space of all measurable functions v : E→ R with finite w-norm. We shall
also consider the weighted span (semi) norm
‖v‖sp,w := sup
x,y∈E
v(x)− v(y)
w(x) + w(y)
.
The norms are related as follows (for a proof see [19], Lemma 2.1):
Lemma 5.1. For all v ∈ Bw we have ‖v‖sp,w = infc∈R ‖v + c‖w.
Let W (x) ≥ 0 be measurable and w(x) := 1 + βW (x) for some β > 0 (the discount factor is
here equal to 1, so we can use β for a new variable). Obviously the norms ‖·‖1+βW are equivalent
for all β > 0. Hence B1+βW is independent of β. Also the span (semi) norms ‖ · ‖sp,1+βW are
equivalent for all β > 0.
For our main results we use the following ergodicity conditions (E):
(E1): There exists a measurable function W : E→ [0,∞) and constants K > 0, α¯ ∈ (0, 1)
such that ∫
W (x′)ψv(dx′|x, µ, ν) ≤ α¯W (x) +K
for all v ∈ Bw and µ ∈ P(Ax), ν ∈ P(Bx) where ψv is given by (5.5).
(E2): There exists a probability measure λ and a constant α˜ ∈ (0, 1) such that
inf
x∈E0,µ∈P(Ax),ν∈P(Bx)
Q(·|x, µ, ν) ≥ α˜λ(·)
where E0 := {x ∈ E : W (x) ≤ R} for some R > 2K1−α¯ .
Remark 5.2. a) Note that for γ = 0 the ergodicity conditions (E) coincide with the er-
godicity conditions in [19].
b) Assumption (E2) is a local minorization property which implies ergodicity of the state
process together with the geometric ergodicity condition (E1). When W ≡ 0, then
E0 = R and (E2) becomes a global Doeblin condition.
c) Note that (E2) is equivalent to
Q(·|x, a, b) ≥ α˜λ(·)
for all x ∈ E0 and for all a ∈ Ax, b ∈ Bx.
Let us now define w0(x) := 1 +
1
KW (x), x ∈ E. In order that ψv is well-defined we make the
following integrability assumption (F):
(F): There exists a constant K0 > 0 such that∫
eK0w0(x
′)Q(dx′|x, µ, ν) <∞,
for all x ∈ E, µ ∈ P(Ax), ν ∈ P(Bx) and
sup
x∈E0,µ∈P(Ax),ν∈P(Bx)
∫
eK0w0(x
′)Q(dx′|x, µ, ν) <∞. (5.6)
For γ¯ > 0 (arbitrarily large) and M > 0 define
γ0 := min{γ¯, K0
M
}
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and B(M)w := {v ∈ Bw : ‖v‖sp,w ≤ M}. Then ψv is well-defined for all v ∈ B(M)w , β ∈ (0, 1K ) and
γ ∈ (−γ0, γ0), since∫
E
eγv(x
′)Qˆ(dx′|x, µ, ν) ≤ const. ·
∫
E
eK0w0(x
′)Q(dx′|x, µ, ν) <∞.
We show next that condition (E2) also holds for the transition kernels ψv:
Lemma 5.3. Let γ ∈ (−γ0, γ0), β ∈ (0, 1K ) and assume (F). Then condition (E2) implies that
there exists a probability measure λ˜ and a constant α ∈ (0, 1) such that
inf
x∈E0,µ∈P(Ax),ν∈P(Bx)
ψv(·|x, µ, ν) ≥ αλ˜(·)
for all v ∈ B(M)w .
Proof. First note that due to (E2) we have
inf
x∈E0,a∈Ax,b∈Bx
∫
B
e−K0w0(x
′)Q(dx′|x, a, b) ≥ α˜
∫
B
e−K0w0(x
′)λ(dx′) =: α˜
∫
E
e−K0w0(x
′)λ(dx′) · λ˜(B).
We consider now the case γ ∈ (0, γ0). The case γ ∈ (−γ0, 0) is similar. By definition of Qˆ we
obtain for v ∈ B(M)w , µ ∈ P(Ax), ν ∈ P(Bx):
ψv(B|x, µ, ν) ≥ 1
eγr¯
∫
B e
γv(x′)Q(dx′|x, µ, ν)∫
E e
γv(x′)Q(dx′|x, µ, ν)
≥ 1
eγ¯r¯
∫
B e
−K0w0(x′)Q(dx′|x, µ, ν)∫
E e
K0w0(x′)Q(dx′|x, µ, ν)
≥ αλ˜(B),
where α is defined by
α :=
α˜
eγ¯r¯
∫
E e
−K0w0(x′)λ(dx′)
supx∈E0,µ∈P(Ax),ν∈P(Bx)
∫
eK0w0(x′)Q(dx′|x, µ, ν) < 1
and is thus independent of M and β. 
Moreover, we need the following constants (see [19]): For δ0 := α¯ + 2
K
R < 1 and α0 ∈ (0, α)
let
β :=
α0
K
, α := (1− α+ α0) ∨ 2 +Rβδ0
2 +Rβ
and M :=
r¯
1− α.
From now on we consider w(x) = 1 + βW (x) with W from (E1) and β := α0K <
1
K . The next
theorem is crucial for the solution of the average risk-sensitive game.
Theorem 5.4. Let γ ∈ (−γ0, γ0) and assume (E) and (F). Then U : Bw → Bw and for all
v1, v2 ∈ B(M)w
‖Uv1 − Uv2‖sp,w ≤ α‖v1 − v2‖sp,w
where α ∈ (0, 1) has been defined above.
Proof. The fact that U : Bw → Bw follows from (E1). For the second statement we use the
representation of U in (5.4). Let v1, v2 ∈ B(M)w and x1, x2 ∈ E. In order to obtain the right
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estimate we define the following ε-minimizer or maximizer respectively for an ε > 0:
ν1 := ε− argminν
{
sup
µ
sup
ψ
{
rˆ(x1, µ, ν) +
∫
v2(x
′)ψ(dx′|x1)− 1
γ
I
(
ψ, Qˆ(·|x1, µ, ν)
}}
µ1 := ε− argmaxµ
{
sup
ψ
{
rˆ(x1, µ, ν1) +
∫
v1(x
′)ψ(dx′|x1)− 1
γ
I
(
ψ, Qˆ(·|x1, µ, ν1)
}}
ν2 = ε− argminν
{
sup
µ
sup
ψ
{
rˆ(x2, µ, ν) +
∫
v1(x
′)ψ(dx′|x2)− 1
γ
I
(
ψ, Qˆ(·|x2, µ, ν)
}}
µ2 = ε− argmaxµ
{
sup
ψ
{
rˆ(x2, µ, ν2) +
∫
v2(x
′)ψ(dx′|x2)− 1
γ
I
(
ψ, Qˆ(·|x2, µ, ν2)
}}
.
Then we obtain that
(Uv1)(x1)− (Uv2)(x1)−
(
(Uv1)(x2)− (Uv2)(x2)
)
≤ sup
µ
sup
ψ
{
rˆ(x1, µ, ν1) +
∫
v1(x
′)ψ(dx′|x1)− 1
γ
I
(
ψ, Qˆ(·|x1, µ, ν1)
)}
− sup
µ
sup
ψ
{
rˆ(x1, µ, ν1) +
∫
v2(x
′)ψ(dx′|x1)− 1
γ
I
(
ψ, Qˆ(·|x1, µ, ν1)
)}
− sup
µ
sup
ψ
{
rˆ(x2, µ, ν2) +
∫
v1(x
′)ψ(dx′|x2)− 1
γ
I
(
ψ, Qˆ(·|x2, µ, ν2)
)}
+ sup
µ
sup
ψ
{
rˆ(x2, µ, ν2) +
∫
v2(x
′)ψ(dx′|x2)− 1
γ
I
(
ψ, Qˆ(·|x2, µ, ν2)
)}− 2ε
≤ sup
ψ
{
rˆ(x1, µ1, ν1) +
∫
v1(x
′)ψ(dx′|x1)− 1
γ
I
(
ψ, Qˆ(·|x1, µ1, ν1)
)}
− sup
ψ
{
rˆ(x1, µ1, ν1) +
∫
v2(x
′)ψ(dx′|x1)− 1
γ
I
(
ψ, Qˆ(·|x1, µ1, ν1)
)}
− sup
ψ
{
rˆ(x2, µ2, ν2) +
∫
v1(x
′)ψ(dx′|x2)− 1
γ
I
(
ψ, Qˆ(·|x2, µ2, ν2)
)}
+ sup
ψ
{
rˆ(x2, µ2, ν2) +
∫
v2(x
′)ψ(dx′|x2)− 1
γ
I
(
ψ, Qˆ(·|x2, µ2, ν2)
)}− 4ε
≤
∫ (
v1(x
′)− v2(x′)
)
ψv1(dx
′|x1, µ1, ν1)−
∫ (
v1(x
′)− v2(x′)
)
ψv2(dx
′|x2, µ2, ν2)− 4ε.
Then we let ε ↓ 0 and proceed with the inequality as follows, where c ∈ R is arbitrary:∫ (
v1(x
′)− v2(x′)
)
ψv1(dx
′|x1, µ1, ν1)−
∫ (
v1(x
′)− v2(x′)
)
ψv2(dx
′|x2, µ2, ν2) =
=
∫ (
v1(x
′)− v2(x′) + c
)
ψv1(dx
′|x1, µ1, ν1)−
∫ (
v1(x
′)− v2(x′) + c
)
ψv2(dx
′|x2, µ2, ν2)
=
∫
v1(x
′)− v2(x′) + c
w(x′)
w(x′)ψv1(dx
′|x1, µ1, ν1)−
∫
v1(x
′)− v2(x′) + c
w(x′)
w(x′)ψv2(dx
′|x2, µ2, ν2).
Now we go ahead as in [19] and distinguish two cases:
Case 1: W (x1) +W (x2) ≥ R.
Here we obtain∫
v1(x
′)− v2(x′) + c
w(x′)
w(x′)ψv1(dx
′|x1, µ1, ν1)−
∫
v1(x
′)− v2(x′) + c
w(x′)
w(x′)ψv2(dx
′|x2, µ2, ν2)
≤ ‖v1 − v2 + c‖w ·
(∫
w(x′)ψv1(dx
′|x1, µ1, ν1) +
∫
w(x′)ψv2(dx
′|x2, µ2, ν2)
)
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Taking the infimum over all c ∈ R we obtain the first inequality below using Lemma 5.1. The
remainder follows from (E1) as in the proof of Theorem 3.1 in [19]:∫ (
v1(x
′)− v2(x′)
)
ψv1(dx
′|x1, µ1, ν1)−
∫ (
v1(x
′)− v2(x′)
)
ψv2(dx
′|x2, µ2, ν2)
≤ ‖v1 − v2‖sp,w ·
(∫
w(x′)dψv1(dx
′|x1, µ1, ν1) +
∫
w(x′)ψv2(dx
′|x2, µ2, ν2)
)
≤ ‖v1 − v2‖sp,w ·
(
2 + βα¯W (x1) + βα¯W (x2) + 2βK
)
≤ ‖v1 − v2‖sp,w ·
(
2 + βδ0W (x1) + βδ0W (x2)
)
≤ ‖v1 − v2‖sp,w · δ1
(
2 + βW (x1) + βW (x2)
)
with δ1 :=
2+Rβδ0
2+Rβ < 1. Altogether the claim follows.
Case 2: W (x1) +W (x2) ≤ R. Then x1, x2 ∈ E0.
Here we define for i = 1, 2 using Lemma 5.3:
ψ˜vi(·|xi, µi, νi) =
1
1− αψvi(·|xi, µi, νi)−
α
1− αλ˜(·).
Hence for a measurable function h : E→ R we obtain∫
h(x′)ψvi(dx
′|xi, µi, νi) = (1− α)
∫
h(x′)ψ˜vi(dx
′|xi, µi, νi) + α
∫
h(x′)dλ˜.
Then we get in the same way as in [19] Theorem 3.1:∫
v1(x
′)− v2(x′)
w(x′)
w(x′)ψv1(dx
′|x1, µ1, ν1)−
∫
v1(x
′)− v2(x′)
w(x′)
w(x′)ψv2(dx
′|x2, µ2, ν2)
= (1− α)
∫
v1(x
′)− v2(x′)
w(x′)
w(x′)ψ˜v1(dx
′|x1, µ1, ν1)−
−(1− α)
∫
v1(x
′)− v2(x′)
w(x′)
w(x′)ψ˜v2(dx
′|x2, µ2, ν2)
≤ ‖v1 − v2‖sp,w(1− α) ·
(∫
w(x′)dψ˜v1(dx
′|x1, µ1, ν1) +
∫
w(x′)ψ˜v2(dx
′|x2, µ2, ν2)
)
≤ ‖v1 − v2‖sp,w ·
(
2(1− α) + βα¯W (x1) + βα¯W (x2) + 2βK
)
.
Recalling the definition of β and setting δ2 := (1− (α− α0)) ∨ α¯ yields∫ (
v1(x
′)− v2(x′)
)
ψv1(dx
′|x1, µ1, ν1)−
∫ (
v1(x
′)− v2(x′)
)
ψv2(dx
′|x2, µ2, ν2)
≤ ‖v1 − v2‖sp,w ·
(
2(1− (α− α0)) + βα¯W (x1) + βα¯W (x2)
)
≤ ‖v1 − v2‖sp,w · δ2
(
2 + βW (x1) + βW (x2)
)
.
Combining above results, the statement follows.

Next we show the following lemma.
Lemma 5.5. Assume (E) and (F). For all v1, v2 ∈ Bw, f ∈ F and g ∈ G it holds:
a) limn→∞ 1n‖Unfgv1 − Unfgv2‖w = 0.
b) limn→∞ 1n‖Unv1 − Unv2‖w = 0.
Proof. a) First we claim for all v1, v2 ∈ Bw, f ∈ F, g ∈ G and n ∈ N:
(Unfgv1)(x)− (Unfgv2)(x) ≤ ‖v1 − v2‖w
(
βα¯nW (x) + (βK + 1)
n−1∑
k=0
α¯k
)
.
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Note that ‖v1 − v2‖w <∞ since v1, v2 ∈ Bw. The proof is by induction on n. For n = 1
we obtain:
(Ufgv1)(x)− (Ufgv2)(x) ≤
∫
(v1(x
′)− v2(x′))ψv1(dx′|x, f(x), g(x))
=
∫
v1(x
′)− v2(x′)
1 + βW (x′)
(1 + βW (x′))ψv1(dx
′|x, f(x), g(x))
≤ ‖v1 − v2‖w
(
1 + β
∫
W (x′)ψv1(dx
′|x, f(x), g(x)))
≤ ‖v1 − v2‖w
(
βα¯W (x) + 1 + βK
)
.
This is the statement for n = 1. Suppose the statement is true for n. For n+1 we obtain
(Un+1fg v1)(x)− (Un+1fg v2)(x) ≤
∫ (
(Unfgv1)(x
′)− (Unfgv2)(x′)
)
ψUnfgv1(dx
′|x, f(x), g(x))
≤ ‖v1 − v2‖w
∫ (
βα¯nW (x′) + (βK + 1)
n−1∑
k=0
α¯k
)
ψUnfgv1(dx
′|x, f(x), g(x))
≤ ‖v1 − v2‖w
(
βα¯n+1W (x) + (βK + 1)
n∑
k=0
α¯k
)
.
Interchanging the roles of v1 and v2 and dividing by 1 + βW (x) yields that
‖Unfgv1 − Unfgv2‖w ≤ ‖v1 − v2‖w · const.
which implies the result.
b) Similar to part a) and the derivation of the estimate in Theorem 5.4.

For the last result let us denote by Cw := {v ∈ Bw : v is continuous} and C(M)w := {v ∈ B(M)w :
v is continuous}. Moreover, we need the assumption
(A4’): W is continuous and for all v ∈ Cw the function (x, µ, ν) 7→
∫
ev(x
′)Qˆ(dx′|x, µ, ν) is
continuous.
Remark 5.6. Note that (A4′) directly implies (5.6), if E0 is compact.
Now we are able to prove our main result for the ergodic game.
Theorem 5.7. Let γ ∈ (−γ0, γ0) and assume (A1)-(A3),(A4’), (E) and (F).
a) The Poisson equation
φ+ v(x) = (Uv)(x), x ∈ E
has a solution (φ∗, v∗) ∈ R+ × Cw where φ∗ is unique.
b) There exist measurable functions (f∗, g∗) ∈ F × G such that (f∗(x), g∗(x)) is a saddle
point of
(f, g) 7→ (Ufgv∗)(x), x ∈ E
for all (f, g) ∈ F × G. Then φ∗ is the value of the average risk-sensitive game and
the stationary policies (f∗, f∗, . . .) and (g∗, g∗, . . .) are average risk-sensitive optimal for
player 1 and 2 respectively. In particular, Jf∗g∗(x) = φ
∗ = J(x) for all x ∈ E.
Proof. a) We consider the following sequence of functions: v0 := 0, vn := U
n0 for n ∈ N.
We claim that vn ∈ C(M)w . The statement is obvious for v0. Suppose the statement is
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true for vn. For n+ 1 we obtain:
‖vn+1‖sp,w ≤ ‖vn+1 − vn‖sp,w + . . .+ ‖v2 − v1‖sp,w + ‖v1‖sp,w
= ‖U(Un0)− U(Un−10)‖sp,w + . . .+ ‖U(U0)− U0‖sp,w + ‖U0‖sp,w
≤ αn−1‖U0‖sp,w + αn−2‖U0‖sp,w + . . .+ ‖U0‖sp,w
≤ r¯
1− α = M.
Moreover, (A1)-(A3),(A4’) imply that vn+1 ∈ C(M)w . Hence according to Theorem 5.4
(vn) is a Cauchy sequence in Cw with limit v∗ ∈ Cw and ‖Uv∗− v∗‖sp,w = 0. Hence there
exists a constant φ∗ ∈ R with φ∗ = Uv∗−v∗ or equivalently φ∗+v∗ = Uv∗. It remains to
show the uniqueness of φ∗. Suppose that there exists another pair (φ, v) ∈ R×Cw which
satisfies the Poisson equation, i.e. φ+ v = Uv. Iterating both inequalities n-times yields
nφ+v = Unv and nφ∗+v∗ = Unv∗. Thus, 1n‖nφ+v−nφ∗−v∗‖w = 1n‖Unv−Unv∗‖w → 0
for n→∞ according to Lemma 5.5, which implies φ = φ∗.
b) The existence of the saddle point (f∗, g∗) follows again from the classical selection theo-
rem and the minimax theorem. The saddle point property implies that Uf∗g∗v
∗ = Uv∗.
Thus we obtain nφ∗ + v∗ = Unf∗g∗v
∗ which implies 1n‖nφ∗ − Unf∗g∗v∗‖w → 0 for n → ∞.
Since according to Lemma 5.5 we obtain 1n‖Unf∗g∗0 − Unf∗g∗v∗‖w → 0 for n → ∞, it
follows that Jf∗g∗(x) = φ
∗ ∈ R for all x ∈ E. As in the proof of Theorem 4.1 we obtain
for arbitrary policies pi = (f1, f2, . . .) and σ = (g1, g2, . . .) that
Uf1g∗ . . . Ufng∗v
∗ ≤ Uf∗g∗ . . . Uf∗g∗v∗ ≤ Uf∗g1 . . . Uf∗gnv∗.
This implies again due to Lemma 5.5 that
Jpig∗ ≤ Jf∗g∗ ≤ Jf∗σ.
But this finally implies that the pair
(
(f∗, f∗, . . .), (g∗, g∗, . . .)
)
is a saddle point and
J(x) = Jf∗g∗(x) = φ
∗. Moreover, the last equation shows that φ∗ ∈ R+.

Remark 5.8. Solutions of the Poisson equation can also be constructed by means of finite
horizon games or by the so-called vanishing discount approach (see [30], for the risk-neutral
case.)
Remark 5.9. Assumption (E1) seems to be very restrictive at first glance because we suppose
that it holds for all v ∈ Bw. However, in applications it is often reasonable to restrict Bw
further to functions v with certain properties. We give a quite general example here: Suppose
that E = R and Ax and Bx are independent of x. Moreover, let γ < 0 and assume that W
is increasing (which is satisfied in almost all applications). Further we assume that a so-called
’monotone’ risk-sensitive game is given, i.e. we assume
(i) x 7→ r(x, a, b) is increasing for all a ∈ A, b ∈ B.
(ii) Q(·|x, a, b) is stochastically monotone for all a ∈ A, b ∈ B, i.e. Q(·|x, a, b) ≤st Q(·|x′, a, b)
if x ≤ x′ where ≤st is the usual stochastic order (see e.g. [28], Chapter 5).
Under these structural assumptions on the game, it is easy to see that the U -operator maps
increasing functions into increasing functions (for a discussion in the MDP context see [3],
chapter 2.4.4). In this case we can restrict our considerations to the set
BIw := Bw ∩ {v : E→ R : v is increasing }
since the interesting functions vn in Theorem 5.7 satisfy vn = U
n0 ∈ BIw. Note that v∗ ∈ Bw by
the general theory and v∗ is increasing as the limit of the Cauchy sequence (vn). Hence we need
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(E1) only for functions v ∈ BIw in which case the condition reduces to:∫
W (x′)ψv(dx′|x, µ, ν) =
∫
W (x′)eγv(x′)Qˆ(dx′|x, µ, ν)∫
eγv(x′)Qˆ(dx′|x, µ, ν)
≤
∫
W (x′)Qˆ(dx′|x, µ, ν).
due to the fact that the random variables W (X) and eγv(X) are negatively correlated which
implies∫
W (x′)eγv(x
′)Qˆ(dx′|x, µ, ν) ≤
(∫
W (x′)Qˆ(dx′|x, µ, ν)
)(∫
eγv(x
′)Qˆ(dx′|x, µ, ν)
)
.
Hence (E1) is satisfied when∫
W (x′)Qˆ(dx′|x, µ, ν) ≤ α¯W (x) +K (5.7)
which does not depend on v ∈ Bw. A sufficient condition for (5.7) is∫
W (x′)Q(dx′|x, a, b) ≤ eγr¯
(
α¯W (x) +K
)
for all a ∈ A, b ∈ B.
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